TQ-4999

			6 MAY 1982	1
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelli Deputy Director of Central			
VIA:	Deputy Director for Intelli	gence		
FROM:	Director of Scientific and	Weapons Resear	rch	25X1
SUBJECT:	Dense Pack Developments			25X1
	None Required.			
summary of the p	roposed MX deployment scheme contributions to the formula	e called Dense	Pack, and the	25X1
Dense Pack Br	ief Description			
Dense Pack, which problems faced by the missiles in attack planners, because of concessions.	nners are studying an MX dep th could provide an interim s by fixed land-based missiles very hard shelters spaced re then, would face great unce erns for fratricide, blast en losely spaced nuclear detona	The concept clatively close in a fects, and other than the concept in a fects.	e vulnerability involves deploying e together. Soviet attacking the system	25X1
				25X1
CIA Role in Dens	e Pack			-
5. The uncertainties relative to the fratricide and other nuclear effects are extremely complex. But CIA/OSWR has funded and directed an external analysis contract with to understand these phenomena in order to analyze the effectiveness of Soviet ICBMs against Minuteman and proposed MX deployment scenarios such as MPS. During 1975 and 1976 our focus was on assessing the Soviet capability to avoid fratricide while using two or more				25X1
Soviet effective	Minuteman Silo. During 1973 eness in attacking MX/MPS. I from this analysis.			25X1
				25x1

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6. In particular a 1978 report which we widely disseminated revealed the difficulties closely spaced silos would present the Soviets due to the fratricide problems. Furthermore, we pointed out that the nature of any possible attack against such a deployment would be inherently susceptible to an ABM defense. These and other conclusions apparently have been key factors in the development of the Dense Pack concept. To my knowledge no other comparable analysis was conducted during the 1977 - 1978 time frame and no other reports on this subject have been published.	25X1		
7. FTD apparently began to propose the idea of Dense Pack about 18 months ago. The Ballistic Missile Project Office (BMO) started about six months ago through a meeting with engineers who are key participants in our analysis contract. Because CIA's complex programs to analyze fratricide effects are unique, both FTD and BMO are running all their calculations on the CIA owned computer at using our software. Thus the Dense Pack concept would not be available to DoD today if it were not for CIA's efforts.	25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1		
8. We have an ongoing task with Project which will study, indepth, the various attack options, nuclear effects, U.S. fly out capabilities, and other relevant aspects of this problem. We expect to have a much better understanding of the factors bearing on the specific Dense Pack deployment proposal in the near future. However, we face major areas of uncertainty particularly concerning the nuclear effects resulting from a laydown of so many warheads in such a small area. Nonetheless we believe the Soviets probably have even greater uncertainties concerning any such situation. They may have to redesign RVs and fuzing mechanisms among other key system improvements to give them any measure of confidence in attacking such an MX deployment scenario. All this would buy the US the time to find a permanent solution to the survivability issue. 9. As keeper of the keys to the entire analysis effort for the US, we	25X1 25X1		
feel an acute responsibility to continually verify the accuracy of our programs.			
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